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Abstract
Employees incentive to invest in their task prociency depends
on the likelihood that they will execute the same tasks in the future.
Changes in tasks can be warranted as a result of technological progress
and changes in rm strategy as well as from ne-tuning job design and
from monitoring individualsperformance. However, the possibility of
a change in tasks reduces employeesincentive to invest in task-specic
skills. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model showing
that some degree of inertia benets the principal. We then analyze
how organizations can optimally combine several policies to approach
the optimal degree of inertia. In particular, we consider the optimal
mixture of (abstaining from) exploration, managerial vision, organiza-
tional task-specic investments, and incentive pay. Our analysis yields
testable predictions concerning the relations between these organiza-
tional policies.
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1 Introduction
One of the best-known virtues of competition is that it provides incentives
to rms and individuals to search for new opportunities to improve upon
current practice. For Schumpeter, this process of creative destruction is an
essential feature of capitalism. He regards it as a prerequisite for dynamic
e¢ ciency. In the present paper we argue that although the continuous search
for new opportunities is widely regarded as a social blessing, within rms
it provides a challenge when workers can invest in task-specic productiv-
ity. In an environment where workers anticipate that current practices or
activities are possibly replaced by new tasks, workers may be reluctant to
invest in their aptitude to perform their current activities. This reduces
their productivity in the current task, which in turn makes it even more
likely that management decides to switch to a new task assignment. When
workersinvestment in task-specic human capital is su¢ ciently important,
rms benet from reducing the probability of changes in future task assign-
ments. In this paper, we analyze when and how organizations can induce
some degree of inertia.
In the management literature, organizational inertia is a much-discussed
phenomenon (March 1981, 1991, Hannan and Freeman 1984, Rumelt 1995,
Schreyögg and Sydow 2011 and the references therein). Organizations tend
to develop procedures and routines that, once established, are hard to change
fundamentally (Nelson and Winter 1982). Rigidity and inexibility are typ-
ically seen as inherently bad for organizations, as it limits organizationsre-
sponse to changes in the environment and technology (March 1991, Leonard-
Barton 1992, Ford et al. 2008). In contrast, Hannan and Freeman (1984)
argue that reliable and accountable organizations have an edge in a compet-
itive environment. This favors organizations that develop a set of routines
generating stable outcomes, which become a source of inertia.1 One source
1This also implies that inertia will be larger in older organizations, also observed by
Downs (1967) in public bureaucracies. Ruef (1997) studies the response of Californian
hospitals to the introduction of new technologies and changes in regulation between 1980
and 1990, and nds that relatively few hospitals o¤er new services in response to these
environmental changes. In particular older, larger, and more specialized hospitals are
less likely to change. Kelly and Amburgey (1991) nd that airlines hardly changed their
product mix in response to major deregulations in the late 1970s, with older airlines being
most inert. Instead, in this period, many new airlines were founded. Studying Finnish
newspapers, Amburgey et al. (1993) nds that older organizations are less likely to change
their content and their frequency of publication.
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of inertia is known as the competency trap (Levitt and March 1988), where
organizations keep using inferior technologies and procedures because of
inexperience with superior alternatives.2 When employees have vested abil-
ities and knowledge, they may resist changes that reduce the value of their
specic skills (March 1991, Rumelt 1995). While acknowledging this, we
argue that organizations can benet from cultivating some degree of inertia,
exactly because it gives employees incentives to invest in skills specic to
their current tasks.3
A key feature of our model is that employeestask prociency increases in
experience with performing the task. Evidence on this abounds. Lance et al.
(1989) show that for jet engine mechanics, experience with performing a par-
ticular task is highly correlated with performance in that task. Schmidt et
al. (1986) nd that for several military occupations, supervisor ratings and
work sample performance increase in experience in the job, mostly through
an increase in knowledge on how tasks should be performed. In a meta-
analysis on the relation between performance and experience, Quiones et
al. (1995) nd that both job experience and experience with performing a
task are positively correlated with performance, but the correlation between
performance and task experience is stronger than the correlation between
performance and job experience (see also Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) for
evidence of leaning-by-doing in various settings and Waldman et al. (2003)
for references on learning-by-doing in health care).4 It follows that in making
investments in task-specic human capital, people should take (potential)
2There is a large literature documenting that the di¤usion of new technology is slow
(Griliches, 1957, Stoneman 1983, Chari and Hopenhayn 1991, Ja¤e and Stavins 1994, Jo-
vanovic and MacDonald 1994), or that inferior technology remains in use despite superior
alternatives (Shama 1983, David 1985, Katz and Shapiro 1986).
3 In the literature on organizational learning and routines (March 1981, Nelson and
Winter 1982) it is emphasized that routines are often changed incrementally. Such incre-
mental changes will typically not a¤ect employeestasks and, hence, are not considered
in this paper. The same holds for small changes in product design or marketing strategy.
Using Hannan and Freeman (1984)s hierarchy of organizations inexible core, changes
in organizational goals, forms of authority, and core technology would a¤ect employees
tasks more strongly than changes in marketing strategy.
4Task-specic human capital also matters for labor market outcomes. Using detailed
data on tasks performed in di¤erent occupations, Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) show
that experience with performing specic tasks strongly inuences job mobility and wage
growth. People are more likely to switch to jobs that are close to their current job in terms
of relative importance of task-specic skills, and wage growth for job movers increases in
their experience with performing the most important tasks in their new job (see also
Poletaev and Robinson 2008).
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future changes in tasks into account (Lazear 2009). We argue that this
provides a rationalization for some degree of organizational inertia. If em-
ployees anticipate that their organization responds slowly to future changes
in the environment or technology, investments in their current task-specic
skills are more likely to also be valuable in the future. The cost of inertia is
that the organization does not adapt as well as possible to its environment.
Employees may be reluctant to invest time and e¤ort enhancing their
productivity in their current task due to uncertainty about future task as-
signment. Firm-level changes, such as changes in strategy or production
technology, reduce the value of employeesearlier strategy- or technology-
specic investments. Changes at the job level can have a similar impact.
Consider a university lecturer who is asked to teach a new undergraduate
course outside his main research area. He knows that if he will be teaching
this course for several years, it is worthwhile to make a big initial invest-
ment. However, if within a few years the department hires someone whose
research expertise perfectly suits the course, it is likely that the course is
shifted to the new hiree, which would imply that the lecturer hardly benets
from his initial investment. Similarly, an account manager needs to build
up a relation with a new client, but knows that management may decide to
reallocate the client to one of his colleagues. A good secretary learns how her
superior wants to be supported, but this knowledge has no value when her
superior is replaced. Employeesproductivity in working with rm-specic
IT depends on their investment in grasping all possibilities of the system,
which is useless if the rm switches to a new system. These examples suggest
that if employeesinvestment is su¢ ciently important, organizations could
benet from introducing policies that reduce the probability of a change in
tasks.
In this paper, we rst study the trade-o¤ between employeesincentives
to invest in task-specic productivity and optimal task replacement. Next,
we analyze (the optimal combination of) several policies that allow organiza-
tions to a¤ect this trade-o¤. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent
model where the agents rst-period e¤ort also has a payo¤ in the second
period, unless the rst-period task is replaced in period 2. In period 1, the
principal can engage in exploration of an alternative task. This yields in-
formation on the productivity of an alternative task relative to the current
task. Despite the rst-period investment in productivity in the initial task,
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the alternative task can be more productive. We show that the principal
su¤ers from a time-inconsistency problem: the principal would benet from
an ex ante commitment to maintain the current task for a range of tasks
relative productivity where replacement is optimal ex post. Whereas this
commitment is costly in terms of sub-optimal second-period task assign-
ment, it benets the principal through an increase in the agents rst-period
e¤ort spurred by the increased probability that this e¤ort also matters for
second-period performance. Such commitment, however, requires veriable
information on tasksrelative productivity, which is typically not present.
The objective of this paper is to analyze how organizations can optimally
combine several policies that alleviate the commitment problem described
above. In particular, we consider the combination of (i) abstaining from
exploration, (ii) managerial vision, (iii) organizational task-specic invest-
ments, and (iv) incentive pay. We show that strategically abstaining from
exploration can be benecial, in particular in relatively stable environments
as well as when the rm can invest in task-specic productivity alongside the
employees investments. In the absence of exploration, employees are cer-
tain that current practices will not be replaced, which increases the payo¤ of
investing in task-specic skills. The downside is that protable alternatives
are missed.
We further show that managerial vision or an organizational mission
may mitigate the commitment problem, provided that the agent shares the
mission. As in Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) and Van den Steen (2005),
we model managerial vision as a bias of the principal (or manager) towards
current activities. This bias is possibly shared by the agent. A direct impli-
cation of this bias is that the principal is less inclined to replace the current
activity, making it more likely that the agents rst-period e¤ort has a pay-
o¤ in the second period. However, from the perspective of a neutral agent,
the principals bias also implies that the task is not replaced when there is
moderately better alternative. This reduces the agents incentive to put in
e¤ort. These two e¤ects cancel out, unless the agent (partially) internalizes
the mission. Hence, in contrast to the results in Rotemberg and Saloner
(2000) and Van den Steen (2005), in our setting visionary leadership alone
is not enough to make workers more engaged. Workers should be truly
inspired.5
5This result is consistent with Wilson (1989), who discusses many examples of public
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Incentive pay helps to increase rst-period e¤ort, and thereby alleviates
but not eliminates the commitment problem, provided that the employee
earns a rent. We show that incentive pay and organizational missions are
substitutes. If the organizational mission encourages employees to put in
high e¤ort, this yields high cost of incentive pay. Hence, if the organiza-
tional mission or managerial vision is more inspiring, monetary incentives
are optimally weaker.
Furthermore, we show that both incentive pay and the strength of the
organizational mission are optimally higher when the rm can make task-
specic investments. Organizational task-specic investments, such as spe-
cic equipment, software, or training have a lasting e¤ect on the productivity
of the initial task, which reduces the probability that the task is replaced.
This, in turn, increases the employees incentive to invest in task-specic
skills, which further increases the probability that the rms investment has
a second-period payo¤. Hence, the rms investment and the employees
learning-by doing are complements through their e¤ects on the probability
of task replacement, even in the absence of direct interaction e¤ects in the
production function. Consequently, organizational policies that increase em-
ployees e¤ort, in particular missions and incentive pay, are more valuable
when the rm makes specic investments.
Our nal results concern comparisons across organizations. The cost of
organizational policies that increases employees investment in task-specic
human capital by reducing the probability of task replacement depends on
the stability of the environment. In volatile environments, reducing exibil-
ity is more costly than in stable environments. Hence, we predict that rms
that engage in exploration in relatively stable environments use incentive
pay, missions, and task-specic investment to a larger extent than rms in
more volatile environments. This implies that even though incentive pay
and managerial vision are substitutes, without properly controlling for the
volatility of the environment (as well as for organizational investment) we
may observe a positive association across organizations. Lastly, we predict
that rms that do not engage in exploration are more specialized and make
use of missions and incentive pay to a smaller extent than rms that do
engage in exploration.
We believe that our analysis contributes to the literature on organiza-
managers who (try to) motivate agents by installing a sense of a mission in the agents.
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tional ambidexterity, dened as rmspolicy to engage in both exploration
and exploitation (Benner and Tushman 2003, Greve 2007, Lavie et al. 2009).
For instance, our results can explain why organizations combine a focus on
exploration in particular areas with a focus on exploitation in other areas,
as documented by Voss and Voss (2013). Benner and Tushman (2003) and
Gupta et al. (2006) state that some rms may be better o¤ specializing
in either exploration or exploitation. Our analysis yields predictions re-
garding the di¤erences in incentive pay, missions, and specic investments
between ambidextrous rms and rms that specialize in exploitation. More-
over, we predict how these organizational policies are optimally determined
in relation to the (relative) importance of exploration. Hence, our analysis
provides predictions concerning the mediators and moderators that may af-
fect the ambidexterity-performance relationshipas called for by Raisch et
al. (2009, p. 693).
From an evolutionary perspective, our results allow for an alternative
interpretation. Even when organizations do not deliberately create inertia,
our analysis predicts that in organizations where inertia arises, employees
investment in task-specic human capital is higher. In environments where
such investments are crucial, we predict that an organization is more likely
to survive when (the combination of) managerial vision, rms task-specic
investments, and incentive pay create barriers to change.
Whether and how organizations can a¤ect the degree of inertia in par-
ticular tasks and processes is a central concern in the recent literature on
organizational path dependence and organizational rigidities (Sydow et al.
2009, Schreyögg and Sydow 2011). While this literature emphasizes the
importance of contingencies and self-reinforcing mechanisms, Garud et al.
(2010) argue that actors may have means to a¤ect the course of the path.
Vergne and Durand (2011) argue that managers may be able to select into
and out of paths at the early stage of path development. Our analysis aims
to highlight the policies managers can use to a¤ect path development that
arises from learning-by-doing.
2 Related Literature
Gibbons and Waldman (2006) introduce task-specic human capital, as-
suming that workers build up task-specic skills that are lost when they get
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promoted to a higher level in the organizational hierarchy. In their frame-
work, this can explain cohort e¤ects in wages, provided that a relatively
large fraction of workers who enter the organization in bad times start at
a low job level. While in Gibbons and Waldman (2006) task-specic cap-
ital is accumulated automatically, we study workersincentive to invest in
such task-specic skills, knowing that the skills may become obsolete after
a change in task assignment. Lazear (2009) argues that rms di¤er in the
relative importance of di¤erent generic skills. He shows that it is less attrac-
tive for workers to adjust their investment in skills to their current rms
skill-weights when the probability of an exogenous layo¤ is large and they
are unlikely to nd another rm where their skills have similar relative value.
Hence, the current rm has to pay for part of the investment in generic skills.
In a straightforward reinterpretation of our model, the di¤erent tasks utilize
the agents skills to a di¤erent degree. Technological advances or compet-
itive forces could call for a change in the agents job design, reducing the
value of skill-weight-specic investments.6
Boyer and Robert (2006) explain inertia from a dynamic incentive frame-
work, where the cost of providing incentives for developing successful a
project increases in the probability that the project will not be implemented
due to the arrival of a more protable opportunity ex post. Our paper
shares the trade-o¤ between ex ante incentives and ex post project choice
that gives rise to some optimal degree of inertia. However, where Boyer and
Robert (2006) assume that rms can contractually commit to ignore prof-
itable projects, we analyze several ways in which organizations can shield
their employees from changing tasks when contractual commitment is not
possible. Dessein and Santos (2006) model a trade-o¤ between coordination
of tasks in an organization on the one hand and the need to adapt tasks to
changing local circumstances on the other. They show that organizational
rigidity is optimal when coordination is important and adaptation is not
important. Coordination is achieved through specialization and the imple-
mentation of tasks according to pre-determined rules, at the expensive of a
sub-optimal t with the changing environment.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on managerial decisions
6 Inderst and Mueller (2007) build a hold-up model along these lines, focusing on the ex
post incentive of the rm to change tasks for the sole reason of reducing the rents obtained
by the agent. They show that prot-sharing reduces the rms incentive to exploit the
agents investments.
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regarding corporate strategy when employees can make strategy-specic in-
vestments. The possibility of a change in strategy makes employees reluctant
to invest in strategy-specic projects. Commitment to a particular strategy
enhances employeesincentives, at the cost of potentially foregoing protable
opportunities (Rotemberg and Saloner 1994). Rotemberg and Saloner (2000)
and Van den Steen (2005) show that managerial vision, modelled as a bias
towards a specic strategy, provides employees with more certainty that
their strategy-specic investments will pay o¤. If managers have reputa-
tional concerns, public disclosure of strategic plans serves as commitment to
a specic strategy (Ferreira and Rezende 2007). Bolton et al. (2013) argue
that a CEOs overcondence regarding the quality of his initial information
on the rms optimal strategy serves as commitment, but may thereby also
suppress employeesinitiatives that would show the benets of alternative
strategies (see also Wong and Wang 2012). Mailath et al. (2004) consider
the interaction between strategy-specic investments, strategy choice, and
mergers when a merger makes a change in strategy less likely due to the in-
ternalization of negative externalities. Ferreira and Kittsteiner (2014) show
that competition can foster commitment to a specic strategy, by reducing
the option value of exibility.7 Most of this literature focuses on a single or-
ganizational policy aimed at enhancing employeesspecic investments. Our
contribution integrates several organizational policies, allowing us to ana-
lyze the interaction between these policies in a¤ecting investment in specic
human capital.
Following Becker (1962), a large literature has developed on rm-specic
human capital. As employeesincentives to make costly rm-specic invest-
ments are diminished when rms can expropriate (part of) the quasi-rents
ex post, a commitment to reward employeesspecic investments can be in
rms interests. Organizational responses to the commitment problem in-
clude promotions (Prendergast 1993), up-or-out promotion schemes (Kahn
and Huberman 1984, Ghosh and Waldman 2010), and employee asset own-
ership to increase ex post bargaining power (Hart and Moore 1990). This
literature does not consider dynamic job design.
7Schaefer (1998) argues that organizational change leads employees to engage in costly
inuence activities. This reduces the protability of change and, hence, brings some
degree of inertia. Under the assumption that inuence activities are less rewarding when
the rms prospects are worse, Schaefer (1998) predicts that rms are more likely to change
when their survival is threatened.
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3 The Commitment Problem
Consider a principal, who employs an agent for two periods. In period
1, the agent performs task A. The probability that task A is successfully
completed equals the e¤ort the agent puts in the task. By normalization,
the value of success (failure) to both the agent and the principal equals 1
(0). Consequently, task A yields an expected benet equal to
U1 = e1; (1)
where e1 denotes the level of e¤ort the agent exerts in period 1. The cost of
rst-period e¤ort is equal to
1
2
(e1)
2 and is entirely borne by the agent.
At the start of period 1, the principal also makes a decision whether to
learn the features of an alternative task, task B. This learning can be inter-
preted as exploration. Let c denote the cost of exploration to the principal.
We assume that the agent observes the principals exploration decision be-
fore choosing e1. If the principal has explored task B during period 1, she
can assign the worker to either task A or task B in period 2. In period 2,
the probability that task A is successfully completed equals e1 + e2;A, where
e2;A is the agents second-period e¤ort on task A. Hence, in period 2 task
A yields an expected benet to both the principal and the agent equal to
U2(A) = e1 + e2;A: (2)
Task B yields an expected benet to both the principal and the agent equal
to
U2(B) = e2;B + ; (3)
where e2;B is the agents second-period e¤ort on task B, and  is a stochastic
term, denoting the productivity of task B relative to task A. We assume that
 is uniformly distributed on [ h; h], such that the expected value E() = 0.
If the principal decides to explore task B, at cost c, the principal learns the
exact level of  before the start of period 2. Second-period e¤ort cost is
also borne by the agent and is independent of the assigned task T 2 fA;Bg:
1
2
(e2;T )
2.
In this section, we assume that there are no veriable performance mea-
sures, so that incentive pay is not feasible. We relax this assumption in the
next section. To minimize on notation, we assume that the principal and
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the agent both value both periods equally, i.e. their discount rate is zero.
The agents outside-option payo¤ is zero.
Several features of our model are worth emphasizing. First, the agents
rst-period e¤ort is an investment in task-specic productivity. It increases
the second-period payo¤ only when task A is maintained. The initial in-
vestment is useless in the second period when the task is replaced. Hence,
exploration of task B reduces the probability that the initial investment in
task-specic skills are exploited in period 2.
Second, the assumption that the probability that task B is successfully
completed is stochastic while this probability for task A is deterministic is
for convenience only. What matters is that in period 2 task B is possibly
superior to task A, despite the task A-specic skills obtained during period 1.
Placing the uncertainty on task A or adding an identically and independently
distributed stochastic term to task A does not a¤ect the results.8
Third, several interpretations of the two tasks are possible. Task A could
be working with the rms current technology or strategy, while a potential
new technology or strategy would require di¤erent skills from the agent.
The tasks can be seen as di¤erent sets of job requirements, with ex ante
uncertainty about which job design matches best with the agents skills.
Alternatively, relating to the examples in the Introduction, task A can be a
specic project or client, which could be reassigned to a colleague.
Fourth, the principal and the agent are assumed to have the same ex-
pected benet from the agents e¤ort on either task. As a consequence, there
is no disagreement among the principal and the agent regarding the deci-
sion to maintain or replace task A after period 1. The agents benet could
stem from private benets or intrinsic motivation related to the outcomes
of tasks, or it could be interpreted as a reduced-form model of incentive pay
linked to the projects success. Assuming that the agents benets are pro-
portionally smaller (or larger) than the principals benets does not a¤ect
the nature of the commitment problem studied in this paper. In Section 4,
we will show that allowing for (explicit) incentive pay does not a¤ect the
results qualitatively as long as incentives are not perfect.
Fifth, even though the principals and the agents benets from both
8With stochastic productivity elements on both tasks, realizations could be such that
second-period payo¤s on either task would be negative. If the agent would leave rather
than face a negative second-period payo¤, this would provide an upper bound on the
degree of commitment possible.
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tasks are equal, their preferences regarding e¤ort are not fully aligned as
only the agent bears the cost of e¤ort. This implies that the principal prefers
the agent to exert more e¤ort than is optimal from the agents perspective.
Important in this respect is that the agent expects to earn a rent, so that
the principal does not have to compensate the agent for additional cost of
e¤ort.9
Lastly, parameters  and h determine the relative importance of exploita-
tion and exploration, and, thereby, the cost and benets of commitment. A
higher level of  implies that the agents current e¤ort is more responsive to
increases in the agents (current and future) benets of current e¤ort. On
the other hand, higher levels of h correspond to higher expected benets
from exploration, as the probability that task B is superior to task A in
period 2 increases in h.
The timing is as follows. Before period 1, nature draws the realization of
the stochastic productivity di¤erence between tasks, , unobserved by the
principal and the agent. In period 1, the principal rst makes a decision
whether or not to explore task B. Next, the agent observes the principals
decision and works on task A. If the principal explored task B, she learns 
and decides on second-period task assignment. The agent works on the task
assigned to him. If the principal did not explore task B, the agent performs
task A in period 2. Finally, payo¤s are realized.
Throughout, we make the following two assumptions on parameter val-
ues. The rst assumption ensures that both with and without commitment
in equilibrium the probability that task A is maintained after exploration
in the rst period is strictly smaller than 1. E¤ectively, this precludes situ-
ations where exploration cannot lead to the discovery of a more productive
task or technology. Combined with the rst assumption, the second assump-
tion ensures that the equilibrium probability of project success is always
smaller than 1.
Assumption 1: 4 < h:
Assumption 2: + h < 1.
We solve the game by backward induction. First, consider the e¤ort
9With a perfect performance measure, the agent can be kept on his participation con-
straint, implying that the principal e¤ectively bears the cost of e¤ort. In our model, as in
any moral hazard setting, perfect incentives render other means of incentivization useless.
This also implies that if the principal exerts e¤ort herself rather than delegating this to
an agent, commitment would not be benecial to the principal.
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decision of the agent in period 2. Irrespective of the principals second-
period task assignment, the agent exerts e2;T = .
Next, consider the principals decision on task assignment. If initially the
principal did not explore task B, the agent performs task A by assumption.
Suppose that the principal explored task B. Then, when making the task-
assignment decision, she knows e1 and . Moreover, she anticipates that in
period 2 the agent will choose e2;T =  regardless of task assignment. Hence,
it is optimal for the principal to keep task A if and only if U2(A) > U2(B)
as given by (2) and (3), respectively. This implies that the principal keeps
task A if  < e1. From an ex ante perspective, the probability that task A
will be maintained in period 2 equals  =
1
2h
(h+ e1), where Assumption 1
ensures that in equilibrium  < 1.
Now consider the agents e¤ort decision in period 1. First, if the principal
explores task B, the agents expected payo¤ equals
E[U1 + U2   1
2
(e1)
2   1
2
(e2)
2] = e1   1
2
(e1)
2 +
h+ e1
2h
(e1 + ) +
+
h  e1
2h

+
h+ e1
2

  1
2
: (4)
Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to e1 and solving the rst-order condition
yield optimal e¤ort ~e1:
~e1 =
3h
2h  : (5)
E¤ort increases in , the inverse of the cost of e¤ort function, reecting the
agents responsiveness to incentives. E¤ort decreases in h, as the probability
that task A is maintained is decreasing in h. Substituting (5) into the
probability of keeping task A as given by  =
1
2h
(h+ e1) yields
~ =
h+ 
2h  : (6)
Using (5) and (6), we can write equilibrium e¤ort as ~e1 = (1 + ~). This
expression clearly illustrates that period 1 e¤ort depends on the probability
that the principal maintains task A in period 2. In other words, the agents
e¤ort depends on his expectation of future task assignment. Second, it is
easily veried that if the principal does not engage in exploration, the agent
optimally sets e1 = 2.
Let us nally consider the principals exploration decision. It follows
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from the analysis above that if the principal explores task B, her ex ante
expected payo¤ equals
E[U1 + U2]  c = h
3 + 12h2  6h2 + 3
(2h  )2   c: (7)
If the principal does not explore task B, the agents e¤orts yield a payo¤ to
the principal equal to 5. Comparing this to (7), it follows that exploring
task B yields a higher payo¤ to the principal than not exploring task B if
c <
 
h2   6h+ 22 (h  2)
(2h  )2 : (8)
Equation (8) denes the range of parameters for which the principal
chooses to explore task B. Not surprisingly, if the cost of exploration are
too large, the principal refrains from exploring. More interestingly, using
Assumption 1, it is easily derived that there exists ranges of h and  for
which the principal chooses not to explore task B even when c = 0.10 The
explanation for this result is that by not exploring task B, the principal
induces the agent to expend more e¤ort in period 1. To put it di¤erently,
the probability that task A will be replaced in period 2 discourages the agent
to invest in task A. As we discuss below, the principal faces a commitment
problem when engaging in exploration. Abstaining from exploration can be
seen as a device to alleviate but not eliminate the commitment problem.
The key feature of our game is the presence of a time-inconsistency prob-
lem in case of exploration. Once e1 is xed, it is best to maintain task A if
 < e1. The problem is that this ex post optimal replacement decision does
not take the e¤ect on the agents rst-period e¤ort into account. To deter-
mine the ex ante optimal replacement decision, suppose that an exploring
principal can commit herself to keep task A if  < z. Proposition 1 gives
the main result of the base model.
Proposition 1 Given the decision to explore task B, the principal faces a
time-inconsistency problem: ex ante the principal wants to commit herself
to keeping task A for values of  for which ex post she wants to replace task
A. The benet of commitment equals (3h)
2
4(h )(2h )2 > 0, and decreases in h
and increases in .
10This occurs if  >
 
3
2
  1
2
p
7

h.
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Proof. Given that task A is maintained if  < z, the agent anticipates
that with probability C = 12h(h+ z) he will continue working on task A in
period 2. Therefore, rst-period e¤ort results from maximizing
E[U1 + U2   1
2
(e1)
2   1
2
(e2)
2] = e1   1
2
(e1)
2 +
h+ z
2h
(e1 + ) +
+
h  z
2h

+
1
2
(h+ z)

  1
2

with respect to e1, yielding optimal e¤ort eC1 = 

1 +
h+ z
2h

. The agents
e¤ort is increasing in z, as the probability that the agent works on task A
increases in z. The principals total expected payo¤ can now be written as
E (U1 + U2) = e
C
1 +
h+ z
2h
 
eC1 + 

+
h  z
2h

+
1
2
(h+ z)

: (9)
Maximizing (9) with respect to z gives the ex ante optimal replacement
decision to keep task A if  < zC =
3h
h  : This yields
eC1 =
3h
2h  2 > ~e1
and
C =
h+ 2
2h  2 > ~:
where ~e1 and ~ are given by (5) and (6), respectively. As zC > eC1 , it is
possible that task A is maintained even though task B would yield mod-
erately higher payo¤. Substituting for zC into the principals payo¤ under
commitment (9) yields
E[U1 + U2] =
h2 + 12h  42
4(h  ) : (10)
Comparing the principals payo¤ of exploration with commitment (10) to
the payo¤ of exploration without commitment (7), we obtain
Ecommitment[U1 + U2]  Eno commitment[U1 + U2] = (3h)
2
4 (h  ) (2h  )2 > 0:
This expression decreases in h and increases in .
Commitment yields higher payo¤ to the principal. This is despite the
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fact that zC > eC1 : the principal commits to maintaining task A for values
of  for which she ex post prefers to replace task A. The explanation for
this nding is as follows. In determining for which values of  to keep the
agent on task A, the principal faces a trade-o¤. On the one hand, rst-
period e¤ort increases in the probability that the agent works on task A
in period 2, which in turn increases in the range of values of  for which
the principal commits to keep task A (i.e. in z). On the other hand, a
higher z increases the expected cost that arises from the possibility that
task A is maintained while task B is more productive. The latter cost of an
increase in z is zero starting from the situation without commitment, while
the additional e¤ort that follows from an increase in z is a rst-order benet.
Hence, commitment is always benecial to the principal. The optimal level
of z balances the benet of additional e¤ort with the increase in the expected
loss from maintaining relatively unproductive activities.
Crucial for Proposition 1 is that the additional cost of e¤ort are borne by
the agent, not by the principal. This disalignment gives rise to all results in
this paper. If the principal would bear the full cost of e¤ort or, equivalently,
if the principal and the agent would be the same person, the outcome with
commitment would be the same as the outcome without commitment.
The comparative statics in Proposition 1 can be explained as follows.
Optimal commitment increases the probability that task A is maintained,
which gives incentives to the agent to exert extra e¤ort. As  measures the
responsiveness of the agents e¤ort to incentives, these benets of commit-
ment increase with . Parameter h reects the degree of uncertainty on the
optimal second-period task assignment, with the probability of a change in
task increasing in h. For larger values of h, the principal needs to commit
to maintaining task A is for an even larger range of realizations of , where
maintaining task A is even more sub-optimal, in order to obtain a given
increase in the probability of maintaining task A. Hence, commitment is
less e¤ective for larger values of h, implying that the value of commitment
is smaller in more volatile environments. This corresponds to predictions in
the literature on organizational change and inertia (Hannan and Freeman
1984, March 1991) as well as to empirical ndings (Miller and Chen 1994).
Now consider the principals exploration decision given commitment. A
comparison between the principals payo¤ under exploration (10) and the
principals payo¤ without exploration which equals 5 , shows that ex-
16
ploring task B yields a higher payo¤ if
c <
(h  4)2
4 (h  ) : (11)
Corollary 1a follows from comparing (8) and (11).
Corollary 1a Under commitment, exploration occurs for a wider range of
parameters.
In the absence of commitment power, abstaining from exploration can
be seen as a commitment device, increasing the agents rst-period e¤ort.
However, this comes at the cost of a potentially sub-optimal second-period
task assignment. Commitment power would give the principal the possi-
bility to engage in exploration while reducing but not eliminating the
probability that exploration induces a change in task. This allows for a bet-
ter balance between the cost and benets of exploration, making exploration
attractive in more situations. In particular, expression (11) shows that with
commitment power, exploration is always optimal if exploration cost c = 0,
in contrast to the situation without commitment.
In many situations, commitment is not possible. The (expected) benet
of tasks and the realization of ex ante uncertain benet-relevant variables
are often not veriable, so that contracting is not feasible. Moreover, if the
realization of  is such that eC1 <  < z
C , both the principal and the agent
would benet from renegotiating a contract that stipulates continuing with
task A. In the remainder of this paper, we consider several organizational
policies that can reduce the time-inconsistency problem in the absence of
commitment power. In the next section, we consider the combined merit
of task-specic investments by the principal, organizational missions, and
incentive pay. We rst revisit the possibility to abstain from exploration
altogether in the following Corollary, which follows from equation (8).
Corollary 1b In the absence of commitment power, abstaining from ex-
ploration can be benecial to the principal. The benets of refraining from
exploration increase in  and decrease in h.
The take-away from Corollary 1b is that organizations are sometimes
better o¤ refraining from pursuing innovations. While innovations in tech-
nology, strategy, or job design can bring higher productivity, the prospect
of these possible innovations reduce employeesinvestments in skills specic
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to their current tasks.11 In the management literature, the fundamental
trade-o¤ between exploiting current skills and knowledge on the one hand
and exploring new alternatives on the other has been extensively discussed
following March (1991). The typical stance in the management literature is
that balancing both activities (being ambidextrous) is di¢ cult but neces-
sary (Benner and Tushman 2003, Greve 2007, Lavie et al. 2009). Gupta et
al. (2006) argue, in line with our ndings here, that some organizations may
be better o¤ specializing in the exploitation of current activities, in particu-
lar when operating in a stable environment. Corollary 1b is in line with the
evidence provided by Uotila et al. (2008), who use data on S&P 500 rms
to show that in industries with low R&D intensity (arguably corresponding
to a low h in our model), rm performance is decreasing in exploration. In
industries with high R&D intensity, the relation between exploration and
performance is hump-shaped.
4 Organizational responses to the commitment prob-
lem
The previous section has shown that if task-specic investment and explo-
ration are both su¢ ciently important, the principal su¤ers from a commit-
ment problem. In this section, we discuss three ways in which organizations
can mitigate the commitment problem. First, we allow the principal to make
initial investments that have a lasting e¤ect on the likelihood of success when
the agent performs task A. Second, we allow the principal and the agent
to have biased preferences for task A. Third, we allow the principal to use
monetary incentives to boost the agents e¤ort in period 1. We rst de-
scribe the three extensions separately, and then integrate them jointly into
the model to determine the optimal mix of organizational policies. Through-
out most of this section, we assume that the principal explores task B during
the rst period. We revisit the question whether it is optimal to engage in
exploration at the end of this section.
11An alternative interpretation of Corollary 1b is that credibly refraining from evaluating
employees current task performance can give extra incentives to increase learning-by-
doing. Provided that in the absence of evaluation employees keep the same tasks, this
makes employees certain that their current e¤orts have long-lasting benets.
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4.1 Extension 1: (Over-)investment in task-specic produc-
tivity
In the basic model, all investments in task-specic human capital were made
by the employee. However, rms may also be able to make task-specic in-
vestments. For instance, equipment can be ne-tuned to a particular tech-
nology or task. Alternatively, the rm can o¤er or pay for task-specic train-
ing of the employee, or facilitate bonding between employees and clients.
Insofar as the cost and benets of such investments fall into the same pe-
riod, it has no e¤ect on the time-inconsistency problem that we consider in
this paper. However, when the rms current task-specic investment has
e¤ects that last into future periods, it a¤ect the employees ex post optimal
task assignment and thereby the employees own task-specic investment.
We extend the basic model by assuming that the principal can make a
task A-specic investment I at the beginning of period 1. This investment
is made before the agent exerts e¤ort and can be observed by the agent.
Investing I yields a cost to the principal in the rst period equal to
1
2
I2.
Investing increases the probability of success in the second period by I, but
only if the agent works on task A in period 2.12 Note that there is no
direct complementarity between the principals and the agents investment
in task-specic productivity; all e¤ects on the agents e¤ort run through the
larger probability of maintaining task A after period 1. This implies that the
principals and agents expected benet from task A in period 2 are given
by:
U2 = I +
tX
1
et;A
As the principals investment increases the probability of success when
using task A in period 2, we need to modify Assumption 1 to ensure that
exploration can discover an alternative that is superior to task A:
Assumption 1a: 4+  < h:
12For tractability, we assume linear benets and convex cost of investment, rather than
the arguably more natural assumptions of concave benets and linear cost. Results are
qualitatively similar. Similarly, assuming that the principals investments also has a return
in the rst period does not a¤ect our results but makes the analysis less transparent.
19
4.2 Extension 2: An Idealistic (or Persistent) Principal
Having a sense of mission is the chief way by which managers overcome
the problem of shirking in organizations Wilson (1989, p. 95)
Wilson (1989) forcefully argues that having a mission can be useful for
organizations to motivate agents. Illustrative is his account on the way J.
Edgar Hoover shaped the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the twenties
of the previous century. The denitions of the jobs of FBI agents, the
personnel system, and the training academy were organized in such a way
that each FBI agent exactly knew what was expected of him, then and
later. The cost of having a mission is loss of exibility. Employees may
resist new tasks insofar these do not contribute to the organizations mission.
Moreover, a mission may obstruct adequate responses of the organization
to changes in the environment. According to Wilson (1989), the e¤ects
of a mission depend crucially on the extent to which employees internalize
the mission. In this spirit, Besley and Ghatak (2005) show that mission-
motivated agents need weaker monetary incentives. In contrast, Rotemberg
and Saloner (2000) and Van den Steen (2005) argue that managerial vision,
reecting strong or biased beliefs about the right strategy of the rm, also
motivates employees who do not share the managers vision.
We extend the basic model to analyze whether an organizational mission
can help to alleviate the time-consistency problem identied in the previous
section. We dene an organizations mission as a preference of the principal
and the agent for a given course of action. We model an organizations mis-
sion as a strict preference on the side of the principal for task A. Specically,
we assume that at the beginning of period 2 the principal assigns task A to
the agent if the following condition holds:
U2 (A)  U2 (B) = p+ I +
t=2X
1
et;A   e2;B    > 0,
where p > 0 is the principals predisposition towards task A. The parameter
p reects an intrinsic preference for task A or reects that the principal
receives higher perks if task A is chosen. This is akin to mission preferences
as in Besley and Ghatak (2005), see also Francois (2007). If the principal is
unbiased herself, she can achieve the same e¤ects by delegating the decision
on task assignment after period 1 to a third person with predisposition p,
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as in Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) and Van den Steen (2005).
The extent to which the organizational mission is internalized by the
agent is modeled as a preference of the agent for working on task A equal to
p, with 0    1.13 The agents expected benet from working on task
A in period 2 equals
UA2 = p+ I +
t=2X
1
et;A:
4.3 Extension 3: Incentive pay
The basic model showed that the principals lack of commitment results in
sub-optimally low e¤ort in the rst period. So far, we have abstained from
explicit monetary incentives. This third extension analyzes whether the
principal can overcome the time-inconsistency problem by introducing in-
centive pay, in a limited liability setup. As we will show, incentives mitigate
but do not eliminate the commitment problem.
We assume that at the beginning of the game the principal o¤ers the
agent a contract, consisting of (1) a base wage wt in each period, and (2) a
bonus F if A has been successfully completed in period 1.14 We assume that
the agents outside-option payo¤ is zero and that he is protected by limited
liability. The implication is that the payment in each period must be non-
negative. It follows directly that the optimal contract from the perspective
of the principal has a zero base wage in both periods, wt = 0. Important to
note is that through the assumption of limited liability, the cost of providing
incentive pay to the principal exceeds the cost of e¤ort of the agent. Hence,
the agent earns a rent. The introduction of incentive pay into the model
implies that UA1 = p+ e1 (1 + F ) and U1 = p+ e1 (1  F ).15
13This specication implies that we neglect the possibility that the agent is intrinsically
motivated to work on task A, independent of the organizational mission. It is straightfor-
ward to show that an intrinsic motivation to work on task A leads to higher rst-period
e¤ort.
14We focus on incentive pay as a means to increase rst-period e¤ort. A bonus for
success in the second period also provides incentives for e¤ort in the rst period, but in
the current setting, rst-period and second-period bonuses are substitutes. We assume
here that success of task A is veriable. Instead, we could also have assumed that the
principals task assignment is veriable. By making the bonus dependent on the task-
assignment decision, we would introduce another distortion into the model. The manager
would have an incentive to assign task B to avoid giving a bonus (see Rotemberg and
Saloner, 1993).
15We keep the intrinsic preference for success of the agent here to facilitate the compar-
ison with the previous sections. None of the results in this section changes qualitatively
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4.4 Analysis
The optimal combination of organizational policies aimed at alleviating the
time-inconsistency problem can be found by taking the same steps as in the
previous section. Irrespective of p, , I, and F , in period 2 the agent will
choose e2;T =  for T = fA;Bg. The probability that a biased principal
with predisposition p keeps the agent on task A equals the probability that
 < p+ I + e1 (p; ; I; F ), which is equal to
 =
1
2h
[h+ p+ I + e1 (p; ; I; F )] : (12)
Clearly, if p and I are su¢ ciently large, the principal keeps task A for any
realization of . Assumptions 1a and 2 ensure that in equilibrium  < 1.
First-period e¤ort results from maximizing the agents expected payo¤
UA = p+ e1 (1 + F )  1
2
(e1)
2 +  (p+ I + e1 + ) +
+(1  M )

+
1
2
(h+ p+ I + e1)

  1
2

with respect to e1, yielding
e1 (p; ; I; F ) =
(3h+ p+ I + 2hF )
2h   : (13)
E¤ort increases in bonus F , which is not surprising. E¤ort also increases
in I. The principals task-specic investment makes task A more valuable
in period 2, which increases the probability that task A is maintained. To-
gether, these e¤ects imply that the agents incentive to exert e¤ort in period
1 increases in I.
To understand the e¤ect of p on e¤ort three e¤ects have to be distin-
guished. First, a more biased principal is more likely to keep the worker on
task A, which makes it more rewarding to make task-specic investments.
Second, a more biased principal continues less rewarding tasks. The second-
period payo¤ to the agent when his marginal unit of e¤ort makes that task
A is kept (makes the principal indi¤erent between the tasks) is decreasing in
p, which reduces the agents incentive to invest in task A. These two e¤ects
when the agent is assumed to derive less private benets from successful implementation
of the task than the principal. While smaller private benets for the agent increase the
scope for incentive pay, commitment always increases the principals payo¤.
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of p on e1 cancel out.16 Third, an agent who shares the principals mission
wants to continue working on the task. This motivates him to expend high
e¤ort. This positive e¤ect of p on e¤ort implies that the organizations mis-
sion statement is partially a self-fullling prophecy: the increased e¤ort of
the agent makes it even more likely that the organization will continue with
its stated tasks. However, the bias of the principal comes at the cost of a
distorted task choice at the beginning of period 2. Both aspects are in line
with Wilson (1989)s observations on the consequences of missions in public
organizations when discussing the e¤ects of changes imposed by external ac-
tors: "Resistance to innovation is all the stronger when the members of the
organization are endowed with a strong sense of mission that enjoys substan-
tial support..." (p. 221-222). A proper mission motivates employees insofar
these have adopted the mission, but it also reduces exibility.
We are now ready to determine the optimal investment I^, mission, p^,
and bonus, F^ . Assuming that the principals predisposition is not a part of
total surplus, the optimal values of p, I, and F are given in the following
proposition.17
Proposition 2 The optimal combination of the rms task-specic invest-
ment, organizational mission, and incentive pay is given by
I^ =
h
 
4h+
 
9  2
2h (4h  (3 + 2))   (4h+ (1  2)) > 0, (14)
p^ =
4h (3h  )
2h (4h  (3 + 2))   (4h+ (1  2))  0, (15)
and
F^ =
 (3h  )  1  2
2h (4h  (3 + 2))   (4h+ (1  2))  0. (16)
16 In the Appendix, we show that if  is not uniformly distributed and the principal is
more biased than the agent ( < 1), the two e¤ects may not fully cancel out. In particular,
if the density of  is strictly decreasing over the interval [0; h], there is an additional
positive e¤ect of p on e¤ort from the fact that higher e¤ort decreases the probability of
continuation of the less rewarding task.
17We assume here that investment I and the bonus F are determined by a neutral (super-
)principal. If, instead, these would be set by a biased principal, it is straightforward to
show that both I and F are set at a higher level. Provided that the cost of investment and
bonus pay fall on the neutral (super-)principal, this reduces the optimal level of biased
principals predisposition.
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Proof. Maximizing the principals expected payo¤ as given by
E[U1 + U2] = e

1 (p; ; I; F ) (1  F ) 
1
2
I2 +  [I + e1 (p; ; I; F ) + ] +
(1  )

+
1
2
[h+ p+ I + e1 (p; ; I; F )]

(17)
with respect to p, I, and F , with  given by (12) and e1 (p; ; I; F ) by (13),
yields rst-order conditions
I =

 
2h2   (1  F )2 + 4h+ p
(2h  )2   2h ; (18)
p =

 
6h2 + 2hI   4Fh (h  )
(2h  )2   22 ; (19)
and
F =
3h  2p (h  ) + I
2h (4h  3) ; (20)
respectively. Solving this system of three equations yields the expressions
for I^, p^, and F^ .
Before further discussing the implications of Proposition 2, it is useful to
discuss how each of the three organizational policies works in isolation. We
rst focus on the optimal organizational mission p. Assuming that I = 0
and F = 0; rewriting (19) gives
p =
6h2
(2h  )2   22 : (21)
Assumption 1a guarantees that p > 0 for any  > 0. Proposition 3 follows.
Proposition 3 Assuming that I = 0 and F = 0, the optimal predisposition
p is given by (21), which is positive if and only if  > 0. p increases in
 and  and decreases in h. The organizational mission fully resolves the
commitment problem only when  = 1.
Proof. The comparative statics of , , and h follow directly from (21).
Substituting for p, I = 0, and F = 0 into the principals expected payo¤
(17) with  given by (12) and e1 (p; ; I; F ) by (13) and subtracting this
from the principals expected payo¤ under commitment as given by (10)
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gives
9 (1  ) (1 + )h22
4 (h  ) (2h    ) (2h  + )  0;
which is equal to zero only when  = 1.
Proposition 3 shows that the commitment problem can be reduced by
delegating the decision on second-period task choice to a person biased in
favor of maintaining the task. This organizational mission (or biased view
of the principal) induces the agent to exert more e¤ort in the rst period,
but only when the agent (partially) internalizes the mission. The additional
e¤ort, in turn, further increases the probability that the principal maintains
task A. However, the mission comes at the cost of keeping tasks that ob-
jectively should be replaced.18 The optimal mission has the same e¤ect as
commitment only if it is fully shared by the agent, i.e. when  = 1. For
 < 1, the mission is less e¤ective in inducing the agent to exert additional
rst-period e¤ort as compared to optimal commitment based on the real-
ization of  as discussed in Section 3. This di¤erence can be explained as
follows. Both under commitment and under a partially internalized mis-
sion, task A is sometimes maintained while the agent wants the task to be
replaced after period 1. The agent prefers to reduce this possibility, which is
possible under commitment as higher e¤ort reduces the range of realizations
of  for which task A is maintained ex post while task B yields higher payo¤.
In case of a partially internalized mission, however, e¤ort is less rewarding
as higher e¤ort implies that the task is maintained for even lower realiza-
tions of . Hence, the agent exerts more e¤ort under optimal commitment
as compared to a partially internalized organizational mission.
The results in Proposition 3 correspond to Beckman (2006), who shows
that if the founding team of a young rm is more homogenous in terms of
prior work a¢ liations, the rm puts more emphasis on exploitation. Found-
ing teams with diverse background are more likely to engage in exploration.
More diversity may bring lower agreement on the right course of action,
yielding more explorative activities. In terms of our model, a more ho-
mogenous team is less likely to change course due to shared (but possibly
mistaken) belief in current activities. This facilitates exploitation.
In earlier work on managerial vision, Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) and
18 It follows that the organization (i.e. the neutral principal) would like to replace the
biased manager after the agent has chosen his rst-period e¤ort. Hence, the delegation of
the task choice (or the organizational mission) should be credible and irreversible.
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Van den Steen (2005) show that an unbiased principal can benet from del-
egating project choice to a manager biased in favour of a certain type of
projects. In both papers, a strong or biased belief of the manager about
the future state of the organization encourages employees to work hard on
projects that are in line with the managers vision, even when they do not
share the managers vision. In contrast to these papers, employees in our
model do not only care about whether their project is implemented, but also
about the success of the implemented project. This implies that managerial
vision by itself does not motivate employees, as the e¤ect of managerial vi-
sion is to continue projects that should be replaced, which is demotivating.
In line with Wilson (1989), only when the vision is adopted by the employees
does it have positive e¤ects on employee e¤ort. Our model shares with Van
den Steen (2005) that an organization with a specic vision is particularly
attractive to employees who share that vision, corresponding to a high 
in our model. Besley and Ghatak (2005) have a similar nding regarding
mission preferences, and further show that workers who share an organiza-
tions mission need weaker incentive pay to provide e¤ort, in a framework
without task-specic investments and task-replacement. It follows from (19)
that missions and incentive pay are also substitutes in our framework, as
discussed in Corollary 2a below.
Next, let us focus on the principals task-specic investment. In the
absence of organizational missions and incentive pay, the optimal level of
investment is given by (18) with p = 0 and F = 0. This yields
I =
2h (h+ 2)
(2h  )2   2h , (22)
where Assumption 1a ensures that I > 0. The next proposition shows that
I is larger than the optimal level in the absence of the time-inconsistency
problem.
Proposition 4 Assuming that p = 0 and F = 0, the principals optimal
task A-specic investment I is given by (22). I increases in  and  and
decreases in h. This level of I is beyond the optimal level of investment
when the agents e¤ort would be xed at its equilibrium level.
Proof. The comparative statics of , , and h follow directly from (22).
Substituting for I, p = 0, and F = 0 into the agents e¤ort (13) yields
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e =
h(3(2h )2 4(h ))
(2h )2 2h . Fixing employee e¤ort at e, the optimal investment
is given by maximizing the principals expected payo¤ (17) with  given
by (12), e = e, and p = F = 0 with respect to I, which gives I = (h+e)2h  .
Subtracting this level of I from the optimal level I and substituting for e
yields
  2h
(2h  )2   2h
6h2   h  2h   2
(2h  ) (2h  ) < 0,
where the inequality follows from Assumption 1a.
The principal will use the opportunity to invest in task As second pe-
riod productivity even when the employees e¤ort would not respond to
the investment, simply because it directly raises the probability of suc-
cess in the second period. However, Proposition 4 shows that the time-
inconsistency problem leads the principal to choose an even higher invest-
ment level. Thereby, it is more likely that task A will be maintained, which
makes it more likely that the agents rst-period e¤orts also have a second-
period payo¤. It follows that rms and employeestask-specic investments
are complements, even when there is no direct complementarity in the pro-
duction function.
The optimal level of investment is higher when investment cost are lower
(higher ), which is not surprising. I increases in , for two reasons. First,
a high level of  implies a larger level of e¤ort. This yields a higher prob-
ability that task A is maintained, increasing the likelihood that the prin-
cipals investment pays o¤. This e¤ect also arises in the absence of the
time-inconsistency problem. Second, a high level of  implies a larger re-
sponsiveness of e¤ort to additional benets of e¤ort, which increases the
marginal benet of extra investment. The e¤ects of h are similar: a high h
implies a low probability of maintaining task A; both directly and through
lower e¤ort. It also implies that the agent has a weaker response to increases
in I, as it only has a small e¤ect on the probability of maintaining task A.
Lastly, we focus on the use of incentive pay to alleviate the commitment
problem. In the absence of organizational missions and the principals task-
specic investment, the optimal level of bonus F for rst-period success is
given by (20) with p = 0 and I = 0, which yields
F  =
3
2 (4h  3) > 0. (23)
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This yields Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Assuming that p = 0 and I = 0, the optimal bonus F  is
given by (23). F  increases in  and decreases in h. The use of incentive
pay reduces but does not eliminate the commitment problem.
Proof. The comparative statics of  and h follow directly from (23). Sub-
stituting for F  and p = I = 0 into the principals expected payo¤ (17) with
 given by (12) and e1 (p; ; I; F ) by (13) yields
E[U1 + U2] =
4h2 + 49h  122
4(4h  3) .
Subtracting this from the principals expected payo¤ without incentives as
given by (7) yields
h3 + 12h2  6h2 + 3
(2h  )2  
4h2 + 49h  122
4(4h  3) =  
9h3
4 (2h  )2 (4h  3) < 0,
while comparing it to the principals expected payo¤ under commitment as
given by (10) gives
h2 + 12h  42
4(h  )  
4h2 + 49h  122
4(4h  3) =
9h2
4 (h  ) (4h  3) > 0,
where the inequalities follows from Assumption 1a.
Incentive pay yields benets through higher rst-period e¤ort, which
also generates extra payo¤ in the second period if task A is maintained.19
The expected cost of incentive pay depends on the probability that the
bonus is actually paid out, i.e. on the probability of rst-period success.
Given our assumption of limited liability on the side of the agent, the more
e¤ort the agent exerts in the absence of incentive pay, the higher the cost
of incentive pay. Hence, the optimal bonus balances between providing
additional incentives for e¤ort and paying for infra-marginal units of e¤ort.
Proposition 5 shows that incentive pay does not fully resolve the commit-
ment problem. Like commitment, incentive pay increases rst-period e¤ort.
However, the cost of incentive pay is larger than the cost of commitment
(provided that it would be possible to commit). Starting from the outcome
19 It is easily shown that if there would be no second period (or rst-period e¤ort would
have no second-period benets), the optimal bonus F = 0.
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of the base model, commitment only yields a second-order cost to the princi-
pal. Incentives, by contrast, yield a strictly positive cost to the principal, as
the limited liability constraint implies that providing incentives to the agent
yields a rent to the agent. Moreover, the cost of commitment decreases due
to the additional e¤ort provided, whereas the cost of incentive pay increases
in e¤ort. A direct implication is that if incentive pay and commitment would
both be possible, the principal would only use commitment to incentivize
the agent.
The comparative statics in Proposition 5 can be explained as follows.
A large  implies that the agents e¤ort is very responsive to incentives,
increasing the benets of incentive pay. However, it also yields high e¤ort in
the absence of incentive pay, implying higher cost of the use of incentive pay.
The rst e¤ect outweighs the second e¤ect. Similarly, a large h implies that
a given increase in e¤ort leads only to a small increase in the probability
of success. Hence, the agent responds weakly to incentives when h is large.
This e¤ect outweighs the e¤ect of lower cost of incentive pay through lower
(infra-marginal) e¤ort.
Proposition 5 implies that if incentive pay is imperfect, other organiza-
tional responses to reduce the commitment problem can be more e¤ective
than incentive pay or can be used jointly with incentive pay. This brings
us back to Proposition 2, which shows that, if possible, the principal opti-
mally uses a mixture of organizational missions, task-specic investments,
and incentive pay. We now discuss the three main insights that Proposition
2 yields. Corollary 2a presents the rst insight.
Corollary 2a Stronger internalization of the organizational mission (higher
) leads to a stronger mission p, weaker incentive pay F , and higher invest-
ment I.
Organizational missions and incentive pay are substitutes. If a mission
is more e¤ective (higher ), the strength of the organizational mission p
increases, whereas the optimal bonus F decreases. For a given level of
incentive pay, an increase in  leads to higher e¤ort, both directly and
through the accompanying increase in mission p. This makes it more likely
that the principal has to pay out the bonus, leading to an increase in the
cost of providing incentive pay. If the mission is fully internalized by the
agent ( = 1), the principal optimally abstains from using incentive pay,
F = 0. The reason is that if  = 1, an organizational mission can fully
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solve the commitment problem. Incentive pay, by contrast, is at most an
imperfect solution for the commitment problem. Corollary 2b describes the
second main insight of Proposition 2.
Corollary 2b Lower cost of rms task-specic investment (higher ) leads
to higher investment I, a stronger mission p, and stronger incentive pay F .
The principals investment in task A-specic productivity is complemen-
tary to both incentive pay and the strength of the organizational mission.
The benets of this investment depends on the probability that task A is
maintained, which depends positively on the agents rst-period e¤ort. In
other words, as the principals investment and the agents e¤orts are com-
plements through their task-specic nature, other policies that increase the
agents e¤ort become more rewarding as I increases. This implies that rms
that engage in exploration but also want to provide incentives for investment
in current task-specic human capital are most successful when implement-
ing a coherent set of policies concerning investment, missions, and incentives.
These policies reduce the probability that the rms explorative activities
leads to actual changes. From an ex post perspective, the rm has too high
barriers to change, yielding excess inertia. However, it is exactly this ex-
cess inertia that makes it worthwhile for employees to invest in specic skill
formation.
Third, the three organizational responses to the commitment problem
move together when the environment changes. In particular, if e¤ort is more
important or rewarding (higher ) or if the environment is more stable (lower
h), the principal optimally chooses a stronger mission, invests more in task
A-specic productivity, and sets stronger incentive pay. These comparative
statics follows from expressions (14), (15), and (16), and are captured in
Corollary 2c.
Corollary 2c Optimal investment I^, mission p^, and incentive pay F^ in-
crease (decrease) in  (h).
The implication of these results is that even though incentive pay and
organizational missions are substitutes in inducing workers to invest in task-
specic skills, across organizations or even across tasks within an organiza-
tion, incentive pay may go hand in hand with organizational missions. Orga-
nizations in more volatile environments optimally maintain some exibility
by reducing task-specic investments and limiting the strength of the orga-
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nizational mission and incentive pay. Similarly, when an employees e¤ort
responds strongly to incentives, organizations combine incentive pay with
strong missions and high task-specic investments.20
Our model predicts that in ambidextrous rms, the return to exploration
decreases in the strength of specic investments (both by the rm and by
employees) and of incentive pay, and in the emphasis on organizational mis-
sions. Hence, from a positive perspective, our analysis provides predictions
on how the relation between ambidexterity and rm performance is a¤ected
by other organizational policies, as called for by Raisch et al. (2009). From
a normative perspective, a direct implication of Corollary 2c is that more
emphasis on exploration should go hand in hand with less specic invest-
ments (both by the rm and by employees), weaker incentive pay, and less
emphasis on organizational missions.
To conclude our analysis, we show that if the principal decides not to
engage in exploration, the principal neither uses incentive pay nor organiza-
tional missions to induce additional e¤ort. She does invest in task A-specic
productivity, but only because this raises the expected probability of success
in the second period. This investment does not a¤ect the agents rst-period
e¤ort.
Proposition 6 If the principal does not engage in exploration, she opti-
mally sets F = 0 and I = . The organizational mission p is irrelevant.
A larger  and the possibility to use incentive pay make exploration more
attractive relative to not exploring, while the relative attractiveness of explo-
ration decreases in .
Proof. See Appendix.
Organizational missions do not a¤ect e¤ort when the principal does not
engage in exploration, because in this situation the agent cannot a¤ect the
probability that task A is maintained. Furthermore, incentive pay is too
costly due to the large (infra-marginal) rst-period e¤ort that arises because
the agent is certain that task A is maintained in period 2. For the same
20Assuming a positive discount factor (instead of the no-discounting assumption we use
throughout) makes policies that have rst-period cost less attractive relative to policies
that impose a cost in second period. Hence, the relative importance of missions increases
in the discount factor compared to incentive pay and the rms specic investment. Dis-
counting does not a¤ect the qualitative results in Corrolaries 2a, 2b, and 2c.
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reason, the principal optimally makes high task-specic investments.21 As
in Section 3, the downside of abstaining from exploration is that protable
alternatives cannot be discovered.
It follows that compared to the base model in Section 3, exploration be-
comes more attractive when missions are e¤ective (high ) as well as well the
principal can use incentive pay. Both policies reduce the time-inconsistency
problem that leads to sub-optimally low e¤ort, and thereby reduce the cost of
exploration. The principals task-specic investment, on the other hand, in-
creases the expected probability of second-period success under exploration
but increases the probability of success without exploration even further.
Hence, part of the cost of not engaging in exploration can be recovered
through higher investment, making exploration less attractive.
Proposition 6 yields the following prediction. Firms that do not engage
in exploration are specialized, in the sense that employees have strong spe-
cic skills and are likely to work with specically designed equipment or
software. These employees receive little incentive pay, although their pay
can be tied to the rms performance. These rms have no visionary leaders,
but aim to be experts in their elds, and respond slowly to changes in their
environment. This corresponds to Ruef (1997), who documents that more
specialized hospitals are less likely to respond to changes in the regulatory
environment.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a simple principal-agent model of investments in
task-specic human capital and task assignment when employees are un-
certain about future task assignment. We have shown that organizations
can use a combination of organizational missions, incentive pay, and task-
specic investment to reduce the probability of a change in tasks beyond the
ex post optimal level. Even though the optimal combination yields excess
inertia from an ex post perspective, organizations expect to benet from
increased employee investment in task-specic skills. The most important
predictions that follow from our analysis are the following. First, incentive
pay and missions are substitutes. Second, rms specic investments are
21 If the principal can commit to maintain task A whenever  < z, a similar result
arises: the principal neither uses missions nor incentive pay and makes relatively high
task-specic investments.
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complementary to both incentive pay and missions. Third, the strength of
missions, incentive pay, and specic investments is lower in organizations
that operate in environments were exploration is relatively important com-
pared to organizations that operate in more stable environments. Fourth,
the return to (more) exploration in ambidextrous rms decreases in the
strength of missions, incentive pay, and specic investments (both by the
rm and by the employees).
The impact of extending our two-period model to a multi-period model
depends on the rate of decay of task-specic human capital. Under high
rates of decay, organizations optimally maintain the lower probability of
task change. If decay is slow and the learning curve is strictly concave in
past e¤orts, the benets of excess inertia reduce over time. Hence, rms
may initially set policies that reduce the probability of task change, and
later revert to policies that reduce inertia. This can give rise to punctu-
ated equilibria (Burgelman 2002, Gupta et al. 2006), where organizations
alternate between periods of exploration and periods of exploitation.
We have cast our analysis in a simple model with one agent who can
invest in task-specic productivity. Our arguments extend directly to situ-
ations where project success depends on the degree of coordination among
multiple agents, as in Bolton et al. (2013), Ferreira and Kittsteiner (2014),
and Van den Steen (2012). If the development of project-specic routines
requires coordinated e¤orts among agents, impediments to organizational
change can boost agentsincentives to coordinate. Insofar as this leads to
e¤ective routines, this further decreases the probability of project change.
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A Appendix
A more general productivity distribution of alternative tasks
In the main text, we have assumed that the productivity of task B is
uniformly distributed. Here, we show the e¤ect of assuming a more general
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distribution of the alternative tasks productivity on the e¤ect of a biased
principal. For brevity, we focus on the case where the principal can neither
o¤er incentive pay nor make task-specic investments, F = I = 0.
Suppose  is distributed according to twice continuously di¤erentiable
density g() over support [ h; h] with cumulative density function G(); so
that G( h) = 0 and G(h) = 1. The expected value of  equals zero,R
g()d = 0. The principal has predisposition p, such that the principal
keeps task A if and only if  < e1 + p. This happens with probability
G(e1 + p). The expected value of  given that  > e1 + p is given by
(p) =
R h
e1+p

g()
(1 G(e1 + p))d. Assume for ease of exposition that the
agent does not share the principals vision,  = 0. The agents optimal
rst-period e¤ort is given by maximizing
E[U1 + U2   c(e1)  c(e2)] = e1   1
2
(e1)
2 +G(e1 + p) (e1 + ) +
+ (1 G(e1 + p)) (+ (p))  1
2
,
which gives rst-order condition (using Leibnizrule)
1  e1

+G(e1 + p)  pg(e1 + p) = 0.
A higher p has a positive e¤ect on incentives through an increase in the
probability of maintaining task A, G(e1 + p), but the last term on the left-
hand side shows that it also has a negative e¤ect through a decrease in the
benet of the marginally maintained task (i.e. when  = e1 + p, which
happens with probability g(e1 + p), yielding a payo¤ that is p lower than
the agents payo¤ from switching to task B). Totally di¤erentiating gives
de1
dp
=
pg0(e1 + p)
g(e1 + p)  pg0(e1 + p)  1 :
As the numerator is the second-order condition for optimal e¤ort, which
must be negative, the sign of this expression depends on whether g() is
increasing or decreasing at  = e1+p. With a uniform distribution, g0() = 0,
so that e¤ort is constant in p. If g() is bell-shaped and symmetric around
zero, we have that g() is strictly decreasing in  for 0 <  < h, and e¤ort
increases in p.
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The intuition is as follows. An increase in p has three e¤ects. First, a
higher probability of continuing task A. Second, the average productivity
of task B given a change in tasks is higher, as the payo¤ of the marginal
task increases in p. These two e¤ects cancel out. Third, a change in the
probability that the agents marginal e¤ort results in continuation (which
the agent prefers to avoid as task B is better from his perspective given that
realization of ). When density function g() is decreasing over [0; h], the
probability that the agents marginal e¤ort is pivotal decreases in p.
Proof of Proposition 6
Without exploration, the optimal rst-period e¤ort for the agent is e1 =
 (2 + F ). The principal maximizes
U1 + U2 = e1 (1  F )  1
2
I2 + e1 + I + 
with respect to p, F , and I. This shows that p is irrelevant. First-order
conditions for I and F are, respectively,  I +1 = 0 and   (2 + F )+2 = 0,
implying that I =  and F = 0. Substituting this into the principals payo¤
function yields
U1 + U2 = 5+
1
2
:
With exploration, the principals payo¤ is given by using (14), (15), and
(16) to substitute for p^, I^, and F^ , respectively, in the principals expected
payo¤ (17) with M given by (12) and e1 (p; ; I; F ) by (13). This gives
E[U1 + U2] =
4h
 
h2 + 12h  4   3 + 22+  h2   2  1  2
4h (4h  (3 + 2))  2 (4h+ (1  2)) :
Hence, the principal optimally engages in exploration whenever the cost of
exploration are smaller than
c^ =
4h
 
h2 + 12h  4   3 + 22+  h2   2  1  2
4h (4h  (3 + 2))  2 (4h+ (1  2))   5+
1
2
:
Comparative statics show that c^ increases in  and decreases in :
@c^
@
=
8h2 (3h  )2
(2h (4h  (3 + 2))   (4h+ (1  2)))2 > 0:
@c^
@
=  (3h  )
 
4h+
 
1  2   4h+  1  2 (h  4  ) + 4  1  22
2 (2h (4h  (3 + 2))   (4h+ (1  2)))2 < 0:
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Lastly, that the possibility to use incentive pay makes exploration relatively
more attractive follows directly from the fact that the principals payo¤with-
out exploration does not depend on bonus F while the principal optimally
sets a positive bonus in case of exploration.
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